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1. Introduction
Voter participation is an essential component of democracy, and changes in the level of
electoral participation may a¤ect the political positioning of the competing parties and ulti-
mately public policy. Yet the positive analysis of turnout is still far from established and many
questions remain. This paper provides a comparative analysis, both theoretical and experi-
mental, of fundamental causes of the variation in turnout based on di¤erences in institutions
for political power sharing.
Is it possible to characterize the inuence of institutional systems on turnout, making sure,
in addition, that such comparative results are robust to di¤erent modeling assumptions? In
particular, does turnout depend in any identiable way on the type of democratic regime, the
electoral rules, legislative organization rules, or the degree of separation of powers?
Our idea to make headway on this topic is as follows: di¤erent institutional systems impact
the mapping from election outcomes (henceforth vote shares) to the relative weight of di¤erent
parties in decision making (henceforth power shares).1 Hence we try to assess in a general way
the role of institutions on electoral participation by characterizing how that vote-shares-to-
power-shares mapping a¤ects votersincentives to vote and partiescampaign e¤orts. The role
of individual institutions in determining electoral participation can then be separately evaluated
by looking at their impact on that mapping. In sum, the degree of inuence on policy for given
electoral outcomes is the key exogenous variable for our analysis: we will often refer to this
reduced form mapping simply as the institutional system ranging from a winner-take-all
system to a fully proportional power sharing system as modelled, for example, in Lizzeri and
Persico (2001).2
The results below also depend on another key parameter, namely the expected winning
margin or closeness of the election. Before explaining how the vote-share to power-share
1The relative power of the majority party for a given election outcome varies with the degree of separation
of powers, the organization of chambers, the assignment of committee chairmanships and institutional rules on
agenda setting, allocation of veto powers, and obviously electoral rules. See Lijphart (1999) and Powell (2000)
for a comprehensive analysis of the impact of political institutions on what they call degree of proportionality
of inuence, which is basically our vote-shares to power-shares mapping. Electoral rules determine the mapping
from vote shares to seat shares in a legislature, whereas the other institutions determine the subsequent mapping
from seat shares to power shares across parties.
2See also Persico and Sahuguet (2006) and Iaryczower and Mattozzi (2010).
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mapping and the expected closeness of an election jointly determine turnout, we need to high-
light the main modeling choices that we make in the paper.
Since there is no established or canonical model of electoral turnout, we will analyze the
variation in electoral turnout in more than one model. The common assumptions to all of
the models that we discuss are that (1) the distribution of citizenspreferences over the set of
alternatives (candidates or parties or coalitions of parties) is common knowledge; (2) the only
relevant decision by each citizen is whether to go to vote or not; (3) each voter is described in
a two-dimensional type space, i.e. her preferred party and her cost of voting: the cost of voting
for each citizen is drawn from a general continuous distribution with non negative support.
The main model that we consider in our analysis is the standard rational voter model (see
e.g. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985)) under population uncertainty3, extending the analysis to the
proportional inuence or proportional power sharing system, i.e. the system in which power
shares are expected to be proportional to vote shares. However, we will also analyze the same
comparative questions using mobilization and ethical voting models,4 and the robustness of the
main comparative ndings will nally be analyzed in the experimental laboratory.
Several recent theoretical papers have identied a neutrality result for equilibrium turnout
models of winner-take-all elections, which we call the full underdog compensation e¤ect : The
theoretical claim is that in equilibrium pivotal voting models the expected vote shares of the
two parties are equal independent of the distribution of partisan preferences in the population.
Unfortunately, this result is not robust, as our paper demonstrates. Rather, it is an extremely
fragile nding, based on special and empirically suspect technical assumptions about the distri-
bution of costs in those two models. The property of full underdog compensation identied in
earlier papers is due to either an assumption that the distribution of voting costs is degenerate
(Goeree and Grosser 2007, Taylor and Yildirim 2010a), or is bounded below by a strictly pos-
itive minimum voting cost (Krasa and Polborn 2009), or is identical for voters from di¤erent
parties.5 It is, in fact, not a general property of pivotal voting models. In this paper we also
3Viewing the size of the electorate as a random variable (see Myerson 1998 and 2000) has the advantage of
simplifying the computations without altering the incentives driving the results. Krishna and Morgan (2011)
recently obtained important results in a model similar to ours, but with common values, in which population
uncertainty is key.
4See Shachar and Nalebu¤ (1999), Coate and Conlin (2004) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006).
5In contrast, the original Palfrey-Rosenthal (1985) model rules out the rst two of these special cases, and
explicitly allows for di¤erent distributions of voting costs for the two parties. Taylor and Yildirim (2010b) show
that the neutrality result generally fails if the lower bound of two partiesvoting costs is di¤erernt.
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show that the underdog compensation varies with the vote-share to power-share mapping: the
underdog compensation is always larger in a proportional power sharing system.6
Following Ledyard (1984) and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) we assume a continuously
di¤erentiable distribution of voting costs, but unlike these other models, the support of the cost
distributions of voters is the non negative real numbers. In our model we allow the support
to go all the way to zero; i.e., the density of voting costs at zero is not zero. The technical
details are more complicated, but the intuition is illustrated starkly in Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1985). They assume that the support of voting costs not only includes zero, but also some
negative voting costs. For simplicity, suppose all voters have costs drawn independently from
some continuous distribution F on [ ; c] where  can be any arbitrarily small positive number.
Palfrey and Rosenthals result is that in the limit only voters with non-positive voting costs
turn out, and therefore the limiting turnout rate for each party is identical and equal to F (0).
There is no underdog compensation at all: the party vote shares are precisely equal to their
population shares! 7 We show that much of this logic carries over to the limiting case when
 = 0. Specically, for all   0 the equal vote share result fails. Moreover, when  = 0 there
is always a higher participation rate of the underdog party supporters than the supporters of
the favorite to win: the party with higher ex-ante support is always expected to win, but by
a smaller margin of victory than the ex-ante support advantage (e.g. the opinion polls) would
predict.
Comparing turnout across systems boils down to comparing the individual benets of
voting across systems. In a proportional power sharing system the expected marginal benet
of a single vote is proportional to the marginal change in the vote share determined by that
vote. Whereas in a winner take all system the marginal benet of a vote is proportional to
the probability of that vote being pivotal. Both marginal benets obviously decrease as the
6This comparison has welfare consequences: the winner-take-all system yields higher expected total utility
due to the lower underdog compensation. This welfare corollary cannot be established with models where the
underdog compensation e¤ect is full so all elections are tied in expectation. Even though we will devote some
attention to this welfare discussion in the paper at some point, our main focus is the comparative analysis of
turnout per se. For a rich analysis of welfare comparisons in a model similar to ours, see Kartal (2010).
7Coate, Conlin and Moro (2008) nd no support for the full underdog compensation e¤ect in their empirical
study of referenda. They claim "The logic of pivotal-voter models implies that elections must be expected to be
close even if there is a signicant di¤erence between the sizes of the groups or the intensity of their preferences."
This paper shows that this is a false claim. In fact, except under very special and questionable assumptions,
equilibrium pivotal voter models imply nothing of the kind.
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number of voters increases. In large elections the comparison of turnout across systems hence
depends on the asymptotic speed with which a larger population reduces the individual benet
of voting, i.e. the magnitude of the size e¤ect.8 Quantitatively we show that in a proportional
system the benet of voting decreases asymptotically as 1=N when N , the expected size of the
electorate, increases; whereas in a winner-take-all system such asymptotic speed is slower when
the election is expected to be a tie and much faster otherwise. This fact determines the main
conclusion, namely that turnout is higher in a proportional system when the election has a
clear favorite party while a winner-take-all system induces higher turnout otherwise.9
In order to obtain analytical results, we use population uncertainty (see Myerson 1998 &
2000). Viewing the size of the electorate as a random variable has the advantage of simpli-
fying the computations. Krishna and Morgan (2011) and McMurray (2010) recently obtained
important results in a model similar to ours, but with common values, in which population
uncertainty is key.10 Population uncertainty does not alter the incentives driving the results:
numerical computations we performed with xed population sizes conrm that all our compar-
ative results do not depend on the population uncertainty.
Even though the comparative analysis using the rational voter model is, we believe, well
justied and widely used, our objective is not to argue in favor of the costly voting models over
other models. To the contrary, given that our objective is to convince all readers about the
validity of our comparative institutional results, without necessarily taking a methodological
strong stand in favor of the rational voter model, we study the same questions using other
well known approaches. In particular, the voter mobilization approach to turnout following
the work by Morton (1987 & 1991), Uhlaner (1989), and Shachar and Nalebu¤ (1999), and
the ethical voter models proposed by Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) are possible alternatives
to the strategic voting model because they yield more plausible turnout point estimates if
one assumes the distribution of voting costs is bounded below by zero. They also have some
8As in Levine and Palfrey (2007) the size e¤ectmeasures how the benet of voting and hence turnout
decrease with the size of the population.
9We conduct the bulk of the analysis for the case of two parties, but we show in the appendix the robustness
of all comparisons to changes in the number of parties: in a proportional power sharing system the order of
magnitude of the size e¤ect does not depend on the distribution of ex ante support of parties, nor does it
depend on the number of parties present in the election. Hence the comparison with the winner take all system
is also una¤ected by the number of parties. We also show that in a proportional power sharing system turnout
increases as the number of parties increases.
10See also Krishna and Morgan (2010) for a similar model with private and common values.
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conceptual appeal, as they propose specic mechanisms through which voter turnout might
be higher than in traditional pivotal voter models. More importantly for the present paper,
however, is to investigate whether our results comparing electoral systems are robust to such
extensions of the pivotal voter model.
We show that the alternative models we consider (in which voters cooperate) have the
same qualitative properties of the rational model (in which voters do not cooperate).11 The
robustness of this comparative nding depends crucially on a feature common to all models: full
underdog compensation does not occur, so an ex-ante uneven election always remains ex-post
uneven.
Our results suggest the general point that any model of large elections featuring partial (or
zero) underdog compensation e¤ect, yields the robust prediction that winner take all system
induces higher turnout when the citizenssupport for the two main parties or party coalitions
is very close, while more proportional systems induce higher turnout when one party has a
larger ex-ante support. The intuition is that in the winner-take-all system when preferences are
not evenly split the non full underdog compensation preserves the ex-ante leading party as the
ex-post leading party in equilibrium, hence preserving a high expected winning margin, which
discourages participation. In a more proportional power sharing system, a less competitive
election (i.e. a higher expected winning margin) does not a¤ect the incentives to vote as much.
If one moves away from the convenient population uncertainty world (convenient in terms
of the possibility to obtain analytical results) it is easy to nd the exact equilibrium conditions
to be used for numerical computation of the predictions for any known number of voters.
Hence it is possible to test the comparative results in the laboratory. Since Levine and Palfrey
(2007) gave us already a preliminary set of data with winner-take-all rules, we adopted the
same treatments even in the new proportional experiments, so that the data could be pooled
together.
The experimental results conrm the theoretical predictions of the general model, as well
as other predictions on the competition e¤ects that came out specically from the known-
population model computations.
While there is some empirical evidence about the relationship between ex ante closeness
and turnout (Blais), we are not aware of any empirical work focusing on the interaction e¤ect
11An additional benet of studying the same questions with these models of mobilization and ethical voting
is that they are computationally simpler, and hence we can extend the analysis to any power sharing system,
whereas in the benchmark strategic model only the two extremes can be compared.
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of expected closeness and the degree of power sharing of the institutional system. Even though
the mapping from vote shares to power shares is only partially determined by the electoral rules
(vote shares to seat shares), some empirical work on electoral rules is denitely related to our
topic: the empirical evidence on turnout in national elections (see e.g. Powell (1980, 1986),
Crewe (1981), Jackman (1987) and Jackman and Miller (1995), Blais and Carthy (1990) and
Franklin (1996)) all conclude that, everything else being equal, turnout is lower in plurality and
majority elections than under Proportional Representation.12 On the other hand, experimental
evidence (see Schram and Sonnemans (1996)) suggests the opposite. We will show that these
seemingly inconsistent ndings are easily reconcilable, since the experimental design featured
perfect symmetry in the ex-ante supports for the two parties, i.e. in the case in which we show
that we should expect higher turnout under a winner take all system.13
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the complete analysis of a rational
voter model of turnout, comparing the properties of proportional power sharing system and
winner-take-all system. Section 3 contains the analysis of the ethical voter model and the mo-
bilization model, where even intermediate proportionality levels can be considered, and where
we conrm the robustness of our main comparative results across modeling choices. Section 4
will contain the experimental analysis, and section 5 will o¤er some concluding remarks and
describe potential paths of future research. All proofs are in Appendix B, while Appendix A
contains a welfare corollary and a simple extension of the main comparative result of the paper
to the multiple-party case. A sample of the instructions from one of the experimental sessions
is in Appendix C.
2. Rational Voter Turnout
Consider two parties, A and B, competing for power. Citizens have strict political prefer-
ences for one or the other, chosen exogenously by Nature. We denote by q 2 (0; 1) the preference
split, i.e. the chance that any citizen is assigned (by Nature) a preference for party A (thus
1   q is the expected fraction of citizens that prefer party B). Without loss of generality, we
assume that q  1=2; so that the A party is the underdog party (with smaller ex-ante support)
12The standard caveat is that cross sectional studies are not to be considered conclusive evidence, because of
the small sample size and few data points, cultural and idiosyncratic characteristics that are di¢ cult to control
for, as emphasized in Acemoglu (2005).
13Similar experimental ndings to ours can also be found in Kartal (2011), an experimental analysis developed
independently.
7
and the B party is the leader party (with larger ex-ante support). The indirect utility for a
citizen of preference type i, i = A;B, is increasing in the share of power that party i has. For
normalization purposes, we let the utility from full power to party iequal 1 for type i citizens
and 0 for the remaining citizens.14
Beside partisan preferences, the second dimension along which citizen di¤er from one an-
other is their cost of voting: each citizens cost of voting c is drawn from a distribution with
innitely di¤erentiable pdf f (c) over the support c 2 [0; c] ; with c > 0 (we denote the cdf as
F (c)).15 The cost of voting and the partisan preferences are two independent dimensions that
determine the type of a voter.
For any vote share V obtained by party A, an institutional system  determines power
shares PA (V ) 2 [0; 1] and PB (V ) = 1  PA (V ). Given the above normalization, these are the
reduced form benetcomponents of parties(respectively, voters) utility functions that will
determine the incentives to campaign (respectively, vote) in an institutional system. In this
section we study the base model in which parties do not campaign nor attempt to coordinate
or mobilize voters, hence turnout depends exclusively on voterscomparison between the policy
benets of voting for the preferred candidate and the opportunity costs of voting.
In terms of the size of the electorate, we nd it convenient to assume that the population
is nite but uncertain. There are n citizens who are able to vote at any given time, but such a
number is uncertain and distributed as a Poisson distribution with mean N :
n  e
 N (N)n
n!
Most analytical statements in the rst part of the paper are made for a large enough population,
namely they are true for everyN above a givenN . However, we will easily establish very similar
results for small elections via numerical computations.
Citizens have to choose to vote for party A, party B, or abstain. If a share  of A types
vote for A and a share  of B types vote for B, the expected turnout T is
T = q+ (1  q) 
14This normalization will allow us to match party utility and voterss utilities in a simple way under all the
institutional systems that will be considered.
15One could allow for the support to include negative voting costs. This trivially implies a zero compensation
e¤ect, as explained in the introduction.
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We look for a Bayesian equilibrium in which all voters of type A with a cost below a
threshold c vote for type A and voters of type B with a cost below c vote for B. So on
aggregate, type A citizens vote for A with chance  = F (c) and type B citizens vote for B
with chance  = F (c).
In any equilibrium strategy prole (; ), the expected marginal benet of voting, B, must
be equal to the cuto¤ cost of voting (indi¤erence condition for the citizen with the highest cost
among the equilibrium voters). Hence the equilibrium conditions can be written as
BA (; ) = F
 1(); BB (; ) = F
 1()
We compare the above equilibrium conditions in two systems which di¤er on the benet
side: a winner-take-all system ( =M) and a proportional power sharing system ( = P ).16
2.1. Winner take all system ( = M). In the M system the expected marginal benet of
voting BAM is the chance of being pivotal for a type A citizen, namely
BAM =
1X
k=0
 
e qN (Nq)k
k!
! 
e (1 q)N ((1  q)N)k
k!
!
1
2

1 +
(1  q)N
k + 1

namely the chance that an A citizen by voting either makes a tie and wins the coin toss or
breaks a tie where it would have lost the coin toss. Likewise, for the type B citizens we have
BBM =
1X
k=0
 
e qN (Nq)k
k!
! 
e (1 q)N ((1  q)N)k
k!
!
1
2

1 +
qN
k + 1

Equating the benet side to the cost side we obtain a system of two equations in (; ) (the
M system henceforth). We now show that asymptotically turnout for each party is zero as
a percentage of the population, but is innite in absolute numbers. Moreover, the ratio of
turnouts for each party remains nite.
Lemma 1. Any equilibrium solution (N ; N) to the M system (if it exists) has the following
three properties
lim
N!1
N = lim
N!1
N = 0; lim
N!1
NN = lim
N!1
NN =1; lim
N!1
N
N
2 (0;1)
16Recall that the interpretation is not restricted to electoral rules, as explained in the introduction. Two
countries with the same electoral rule can have very di¤erent mappings from electoral outcomes to power shares,
and this is the summary or reduced form variable that we are interested in and that a¤ects turnout.
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The above lemma allows us to use some approximations to show existence and uniqueness
of an equilibrium for N large and also the following characterization results.17
Lemma 2. There exists an equilibrium (; ) in the M system. For uniqueness it su¢ ces that
F is weakly concave. The equilibrium has the following properties:
 Size e¤ect:
dTM
dN
< 0
 Partial underdog compensation e¤ect:
q < 1=2 =)  > ; q < (1  q)
The size e¤ect shows how the benet of voting declines for larger electorates, although we
will show that the rate of decline depends crucially on whether the parties do or do not have
the same support ex-ante. The partial underdog compensation shows that the party with less
supporters has higher relative expected turnout but lower expected turnout overall. We discuss
all these e¤ects in the following section.
2.2. Discussion of the M System. The partial underdog compensation arises from the fol-
lowing simple equilibrium relationship between the turnout rates for the two parties (see Ap-
pendix)
(1) q
 
F 1()
2
= (1  q)  F 1()2
Since for heterogeneous costs F 1() is increasing, then q < 1=2 implies an underdog com-
pensation (i.e.  > ) that must be partial (i.e. q < (1  q) ). As a consequence,
we have a balanced election with a 50% expectation of victory from each side only when
q = 1=2. With homogeneous costs the result would be di¤erent: homogeneous costs mean that
F 1 () = c = F 1 (), which implies q = (1  q) ; i.e. full underdog compensation and a
50% chance of victory regardless of the ex-ante preference split q.
To understand why the heterogeneity of the cost distribution is so important, assume for
instance that q = 1=3 so that the leader party has double the ex-ante support than the underdog
party. To have an election with a 50-50 chance of victory (i.e. q = (1  q) ), the underdog
party would have to turn out twice as much as the leader party. We claim that the latter
cannot happen unless citizens have homogenous costs. Suppose not; then on the benet side,
17We thank John Morgan for pointing out the importance of proving this non trivial lemma for the approx-
imation results and proofs that will follow.
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in a strategy prole with an ex-ante even outcome, the gross benet of voting is the same across
all voters (as they all individually face the same even environment). On the cost side, since
the underdog party has to turn out more, then we must have  = F (c) >  = F (c). With
heterogenous cost this means that the equilibrium cost thresholds would have to be di¤erent
c > c which, in turn, implies that the cost thresholds cannot both be equal to the benet.
In other words, the underdog supporters cannot fully rebalance the election because turning
out in a higher proportion means that types with a higher cost would have to turn out as well.
To have an equilibrium with full underdog compensation (same benet) we must have c = c
(same cost), which happens when F is constant so costs are homogeneous.
Conversely, as the costs become equal, the equilibrium must exhibit full underdog com-
pensation. The intuition is as follows. Suppose, to the contrary, that with homogenous costs a
pure strategy equilibrium with partial underdog compensation existed so the ex-ante underdog
is expected to lose the election. With such a strategy prole, a supporter of the underdog party
who is abstaining, by deviating and going to vote would bring the election closer to a tie, hence
he would have a higher benet than the benet of his fellow supporters of the underdog party
that were voting according to that strategy prole, a contradiction.
Assuming heterogenous costs determines more appealing features. First of all the underdog
compensation being just partial is what guarantees that the party with more ex-ante support
is the more likely winner of the election. This natural outcome is corroborated by observed
winning margins. Second, on the normative side, having the election result be determined by
a coin toss as in the homogenous cost full underdog compensation case is clearly unappealing
from a welfare perspective.18
The distinction between homogenous and heterogeneous costs and hence between full and
partial underdog compensation is also key for turnout predictions. The di¤erent equilibria with
di¤erent cost assumptions, namely a 50-50 outcome versus a non 50-50 outcome, imply very
di¤erent overall turnout numbers in large elections. In fact, the benet of voting and hence the
18The fact that the 50-50 benchmark result is pervasive in the literature prompted the question of whether
it is of any use to have people vote at all as the preferences of the electorate are not reected in the outcome.
See e.g. Borgers (2004) and Krasa and Polborn (2010). A di¤erent line of work that tries to avoid the full
compensation undesirable outcome assumes that the preference split q remains unknown to voters: if so, then
the compensation e¤ect which rebalances the election and lowers welfare cannot be triggered properly. Hence
opinion polls, which reduce uncertainty about q; may be welfare reducing. See Goeree and Grosser (2007) and
Taylor and Yilidirm (2009).
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turnout are proportional to
BM  e
 
p
q 
p
(1 q)
2
N
p
N
In the homogenous cost case, in which q = (1  q) ; this implies that turnout declines at
the rate N 1=2: In the heterogeneous cost case, where q 6= (1   q) unless q = 1=2; turnout
declines at an exponential rate for q 6= 1=219 and declines at the algebraic rate N 1=2 when
q = 1=2.20
Even though the nature of our work is positive, we want to conclude this discussion of the
M system with a simple welfare corollary:
Corollary 3. Asymptotically, for the population N going to innity, neither subsidies nor
penalties for voters can improve total expected utility in the M system.
This could be easily shown by adapting the proof of proposition 5 in Krasa and Polborn
(2009), since their model is similar to our model of the M system but with a positive voting
cost lower bound c > 0. They show that in the limit the optimal subsidy to voters converges
to c. Thus, when one considers the same model but with zero as lower bound c = 0, the
optimal subsidy in the limit must be zero.21 Intuitively, on the one hand introducing a subsidy
is unnecessary since asymptotically the party with larger ex-ante support always wins the
election in any case. On the other hand, introducing a penalty for voting would bring us back
the ine¢ cient lower bound c > 0 in the voting cost distribution.
2.3. Proportional Power Sharing System ( = P ). With proportional power sharing (P
system) the share of power is proportional to the vote share obtained in the election. So if
19For q 6= 1=2 the argument of the exponential function diverges to  1 (see Lemma 1 and Proposition 7).
20Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981) obtain a similar result on rates of convergence in a model in which
two candidates receive votes as binomial random variables. They assume no abstention, so the number of votes
can be seen as ips of identical coins with a certain bias q. They show that if you toss an even number n of
coins, the chance of obtaining the same number of heads and tails (the chance of a tie) drops asymptotically
like N 1=2 when the coins are unbiased (q = 1=2) and exponentially if the coins are biased (q < 1=2).
21Krasa and Polborn (2010) obtain the ine¢ cient full compensation result with a non degenerate cost distri-
bution because its support [c; c] is bounded away from zero. Hence, unlike what we obtain in Lemma 1, only a
nite number of voters will go to vote even when the population N grows unboundedly large. Asymptotically
their model is isomorphic to a homogenous cost model with cost c > 0.
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(a; b) are the absolute numbers of votes for each party, the power of parties A and B would be
respectively
 
a
a+b
; b
a+b

:22
The expected marginal benet of voting BiP for party i is the expected increase in the vote
share for the preferred party induced by a single vote, namely
BAP =
1X
a=0
1X
b=0
 
e qN (qN)a
a!
 
e (1 q)N ((1  q)N)b
b!
!
a+ 1
a+ b+ 1
  a
a+ b
!
BBP =
1X
a=0
1X
b=0
 
e qN (qN)a
a!
 
e (1 q)N ((1  q)N)b
b!
!
b+ 1
a+ b+ 1
  b
a+ b
!
In this case, unlike in the M system, we have double summations because an A supporter,
for instance, has an impact on the electoral outcome not only in the event of a tied election
(a = b and a = b   1), but also in all the other cases a 6= b. In the P system voters always
have some impact on the electoral outcome albeit very small, whereas in the M system voters
have a large impact in the very small chance event that a = b and zero impact otherwise. A
non obvious quantitative question is to compare how the expected impacts of a voter in the M
and in the P systems decline with the electorate size N . Luckily, after some manipulation the
double summations above can be expressed in a simple form.
Lemma 4. The marginal benet of voting in the P system has the closed form
BAP =
(1  q) 
NT 2
 
 
((1  q) )2   (q)2 + (1  q)  1
N
2T 2
!
e NT(2)
BBP =
q
NT 2
+
 
((1  q) )2   (q)2   q 1
N
2T 2
!
e NT
Similarly to what we obtained for the M model, we now show that asymptotically turnout
for each party is zero as a percentage of the population, but is innite in absolute numbers,
moreover the party turnout ratio stays nite.
Lemma 5. Any solution (N ; N) (if it exists) to the P system has the following three properties
lim
N!1
N = lim
N!1
N = 0; lim
N!1
NN = lim
N!1
NN =1; lim
N!1
N
N
2 (0;1)
22We assume that if nobody votes, power is shared equally, namely
a
a+ b
=
b
a+ b
=
1
2
for a = b = 0
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As in the M system, the above lemma allows us to use some approximations to show
existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium for N large and also the following characterization
results.
Lemma 6. In the P system there is always a unique equilibrium (; ). The equilibrium has
the following properties:
 Size e¤ect:
dTP
dN
< 0
 Partial underdog compensation e¤ect:
q < 1=2 =)  > ; q < (1  q)
The relation describing quantitatively the underdog compensation under the P system is
(3) qF 1() = (1  q)F 1()
which is slightly di¤erent from equation (1) describing the underdog compensation under
the M system.
2.4. Main Comparison. The size e¤ect and the underdog compensation e¤ect, though qual-
itatively similar, are quantitatively di¤erent across the two institutional systems. We now turn
to the implications of these di¤erences and to the comparison of turnout incentives across sys-
tems. Turnout is larger in a proportional power sharing system when there is a favorite party,
while it is higher in a winner take all system if the election is even.
Proposition 7. .
 Comparative turnout: for any q 2 (0; 1), 9 Nq such that for N > Nq
TM > TP for q = 1=2
TP > TM for q 6= 1=2
 Comparative underdog compensation:
1  q
q
=

P
P
n+1
=

M
M
2n+1
where n  1 is the lowest integer for which dnF 1
dxn
jx=0 2 (0;1).
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Regarding the comparative underdog compensation, we have already explained in section
2.2 that with heterogeneous costs full compensation is impossible in equilibrium, and a similar
explanation holds for the proportional power sharing system. In both systems the underdog
compensation is partial: the ex-ante favorite party obtains the majority of the votes in a large
election, but the underdog party has a higher turnout of its supporters. The above proposition
shows that the underdog compensation is larger in the P system, namely
(4) q < 1=2 ) P=P > M=M > 1
Compared to the P system, in the M system minority voters are always more discouraged to
vote relative to majority voters. This result could also be stated as a higher relative winning
margin in the M system than in the P for any given preference split q, where the relative
winning margin W is dened as23
W :=
jq  (1  q) j
T
Regarding turnout, the intuition behind the turnout result relies on how fast the marginal
benet of voting decreases in the two models as the electorate gets larger. The M system has
two asymptotic regimes: it decreases exponentially for q 6= 1=2 and for q = 1
2
it decreases at
the algebraic rate of N 1=2. Since we have only partial underdog compensation, then for any
q 6= 1=2 the majority party is always the more likely side to win. Hence the chance of a tied
election, which is what drives rational voters to turn out, is much smaller than in the case
q = 1=2 for any population size N .24
The benet from voting in the P system drops asymptotically at the intermediate rate of
N 1. This rate is independent of q as in the power sharing system the event that a voter is
pivotal or the chance of a tied election have no special relevance.
23This result, while apparent when the M and P systems are solved, is not trivial ex-ante as there are two
competing e¤ects: in the M system, while minority voters  are discouraged to vote, also (and for the same
reason) majority voters  are. So, it is not obvious that = should be smaller in the M system than in the P
system (where neither e¤ect is present).
24The two rates of convergence derived above do not depend on the (Poisson) population uncertainty in
this model. For instance, Herrera and Martinelli (2006) analyze a majority rule election without population
uncertainty. They introduce aggregate uncertainty in a di¤erent way, which allows to obtain a closed form for
the chance of being pivotal, namely (a+b)!
2a+b+1a!b!
. As it can be seen using Stirlings approximation, that marginal
benet for large a and b has exactly the square root decline on the diagonal (a = b) and the exponential decline
o¤ the diagonal (a = !b, ! 6= 1) :
15
It is perhaps now intuitive that a winner take all system, unlike a proportional power sharing
one, should have two quite di¤erent rates of convergence regimes (although as we explained
this is not the case with a degenerate cost distribution). Be that as it may, only an explicit
computation could determine that the rate of convergence in the P system is quantitatively in
between the two rates of convergence in the M system: N 1 2  N 1=2; e N :
In order to illustrate the comparison in terms of turnout as well as underdog compensation
e¤ects, we now turn to a numerical example.
2.5. Example. Consider the cost distribution family (z > 0): F (c) = c1=z with c 2 [0; 1] :
This example yields an explicit solution for the P system, i.e.
P =
0B@ 1
N
(1  q) q 1z+1 (1  q) 1z+1
q (1  q) 1z+1 + (1  q) q 1z+1
2
1CA
1
z+1
P =
0B@ 1
N
q
1  q
(1  q) q 1z+1 (1  q) 1z+1
q (1  q) 1z+1 + (1  q) q 1z+1
2
1CA
1
z+1
The M system equilibrium has no closed form solution, namely (M ; M) jointly solve
M =

q
1  q
 1
2z+1
M ; 
z
M =
e
 N
p
(1 q)M 
p
qM
2
p
N
 p
qM +
p
(1  q) M
4
p
 (q (1  q)MM)1=4
!
Setting N = 3000 and z = 5, the numerical solutions to the M system yield a clear
illustration of the comparative result of proposition 7. In the picture below we compare, as the
preference split q varies, the turnout T in the M system (continuous line) and in the P system
(dashed line).
Figure 1: Turnout as a function of q in the M (continuous) and P (dashed) models (z = 5;
N = 3000).
16
When one party (e.g. party B) has the ex-ante advantage over the other party (A), we
have a higher turnout in the P system. Numerically, for instance when q = 1=3; we have
q = 1=3   = W T
P 24:8% 22% 1:27 27:8% 23%
M 7:1% 6:7% 1:06 30:9% 6:8%
Note also in both the M and the P systems the presence of the underdog compensation
( > ) which is partial (q < (1  q) ). Moreover, note the higher underdog compensation
= in the P system and consequently the higher relative winning margin W in the M system.
Whereas when the election is close and no party has an ex ante advantage, i.e. q = 1=2,
turnout T in the M system surpasses the turnout in the P system
q = 1=2   T
P 23:5% 23:5% 23:5%
M 40:9% 40:9% 40:9%
Note for di¤erent qs the much larger variability of turnout numbers T in the M system when
compared to the P system.
To compare the underdog compensations in general, the picture below illustrates how
the ratio = varies with q in the P system (dashed line) and in the M system (continuous
line). Contrast these decreasing curves with the steeper one that is obtained in the M system
under homogeneous cost (dotted line) when there is full underdog compensation, the election
is expected to be tied and the winning margin is zero regardless of the initial preference split.
In sum, this example illustrates how the underdog compensation is higher in a proportional
power sharing system, while the turnout is lower in a proportional power sharing system only
when the distribution of party supporters is symmetric.
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Figure 2: Underdog compensation = as a function of q in the P (dashed), M (continuous)
and M with homogenous cost (dotted) models (z = 5).
3. Experimental Analysis
Even though the point estimates of turnout when using the costly voting rational model are
much lower than real turnout levels in elections, as is well known, there is no reason to believe
that the comparative predictions of the rational model shouldnt be of guidance. To verify that
indeed the comparative results of the paper correspond to actual voting behavior, we bring the
model presented in section 2 to the laboratory. In laboratory elections we can have only a nite
number of voters, but the model is easily adapted to this case. The equilibrium conditions
for our laboratory implementation of the model, with nite electorates and no population
uncertainty25, are given below. It is straightforward to exactly characterize symmetric Bayesian
equilibrium for these nite environments, and comparative statics that are similar to the Poisson
model can be computed directly from these exact equilibrium solutions.
In what follows, let NA denote the number of voters with a preference for party A and
NB = N  NA denote the number of voters with a preference for party B, and assume without
loss of generality that NA  NB. As before, a symmetric equilibrium is characterized by two
cuto¤ levels, one for each party, c and c, with corresponding expected turnout levels equal
to  = F (c) and  = F (c). The equilibrium conditions are slightly di¤erent for the M and
P systems, and these are derived next.
25The reason to consider known population size is that the analytical computations with the Poisson game
approach apply only to the limiting case of very large electorates, which is not feasible in the laboratory.
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3.0.1. Equilibrium conditions for M. Given expected turnout rates in the two parties,  and 
the expected marginal benet of voting for a party A citizen is equal to:
BAM =
1
2
24 PNA 1k=0  NA 1k  NBk k(1  )NA 1 kk(1  )NB k+PNA 1
k=0
 
NA 1
k
 
NB
k+1

k(1  )NA 1 kk+1(1  )NB 1 k
35
BBM =
1
2
24 PminfNA;NB 1gk=0  NAk  NB 1k k(1  )NA kk(1  )NB 1 k+PNA 1
k=0
 
NA
k+1
 
NB 1
k

k+1(1  )NA 1 kk(1  )NB 1 k
35
where 1
2
is the value of creating or breaking a tie. In each expression, the rst summation is the
probability of your vote breaking a tie, and the second summation is the probability of your
vote creating a tie, given turnout rates  and . The equilibrium conditions for cM and c

M are
given by:
cM = B
A
M
cM = B
B
M
3.0.2. Equilibrium conditions for P. Given expected turnout rates in the two parties,  and 
the expected marginal benet of voting for a party A citizen is equal to:
BAP =
NA 1X
j=0
NBX
k=0

j + 1
j + 1 + k
  j
j + k

NA   1
j

NB
k

j(1  )NA 1 jk(1  )NB k
BBP =
NB 1X
j=0
NAX
k=0

j + 1
j + 1 + k
  j
j + k

NB   1
j

NA
k

j(1  )NB 1 jk(1  )NA k
Where the rst term in the summation is the increase in vote share and the second term
is the probability of the vote share being equal to j
j+k
without your vote, given turnout rates
 and .26 The equilibrium condition for cP and c

P are given by:
cP = B
A
P
cP = B
B
P
26By convention, we denote jj+k = :5 if j = k = 0.
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3.0.3. Experimental design and parameters. All our electorates in the experiment have exactly
N = 9 voters, with three di¤erent NA treatments: NA = 2; 3; 4. We consider two di¤erent
distributions of voter costs. In our low cost (or, equivalently, high benet) elections ci is
uniformly distributed on the interval [0,.3]. In our high cost (or, equivalently, low benet)
elections ci is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,.55]. Table 1 below gives the symmetric
equilibrium expected turnout levels (by party and total turnout) for each treatment, rounded
to two decimal places.
NA NB cmax Rule  
 NA+NB
N
4 5 .3 M .60 72 .67
3 6 .3 M .51 .52 .52
2 7 .3 M .45 .40 .41
4 5 .55 M .46 .45 .46
3 6 .55 M .41 .37 .39
2 7 .55 M .38 .30 .32
4 5 .3 P .48 .43 .45
3 6 .3 P .55 .39 .45
2 7 .3 P .67 .36 .43
4 5 .55 P .35 .31 .33
3 6 .55 P .40 .29 .32
2 7 .55 P .48 .26 .31
Table 1. Equilibrium turnout rates by treatment.
There are ve main theoretical hypotheses comparing turnout in the M and P voting
systems in the elections we study. We state these below:
H1 For the larger party, turnout is higher in M than in P.
H2 Total expected turnout is higher under M than under P.
H3 The competition e¤ect is reversed for the smaller party in the proportional vote system.
That is, for the smaller party, turnout decreases as their share of the electorate increases.
Under M, the usual competition e¤ect applies to both parties: elections that are expected
to be closer lead to higher turnout.27
H4 The competition e¤ect on total expected turnout is negligible in P elections.
27In the general model with population uncertainty we were not able to obtain general results on the competi-
tion e¤ects, whereas the numerical analysis of the known population case allows for these additional predictions.
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H5 In all P elections we study, there is an underdog e¤ect. There is an underdog e¤ect in all
M elections, except for reverse underdog e¤ects in the low cost 5-4 and 6-3 M elections.
In the experimental section we will return to these ve predictions of the known population
model. But, before that, let us evaluate the robustness of the main comparative predictions by
looking at other voting models.
3.1. Procedures. A total of 153 subjects participated in 1700 elections across 17 sessions.
Each session consisted of two parts with 50 nine-voter elections in each part. The parameters
were the same in all elections within a part, but in each session exactly one parameter was
changed between part I and part II. In all sessions the same voting rule (M or P) was used
in all 100 elections. For all of the treatments except for the 7-2 elections, the distribution of
voting costs were the same for all 100 elections. Half of these sessions were conducted with
part I having 5-4 elections and part II having 6-3 elections. The other half of the sessions
reversed the order so the 6-3 elections were in part I and the 5-4 elections in part II. For
the 7-2 elections, half the elections in a session were conducted with cmax = 55 and half with
cmax = 30, in both orders. Subjects were informed of the exact parameters (NA, NB, Cmax and
the voting rule) at the beginning of each part. Before each election, each subject was randomly
assigned to either group A or group B and assigned a voting cost, drawn independently from
the uniform distribution between 0 and cmax, in integer increments. Therefore, each subject
gained experience as a member of the majority and minority party in both parts of the session.
Instructions were read aloud so everyone could hear, and Powerpoint slides were projected
in front of the room to help explain the rules. After the instructions were read, subjects were
walked through two practice rounds and then were required to correctly answer all the questions
on a computerized comprehension quiz before the experiment began. After the rst 50 rounds,
a very short set of new instructions were read aloud to explain the change of parameters.
The wording in the instructions was written so as to induce as neutral an environment
as possible.28 There was no mention of voting or winning or losing or costs. The labels were
abstract. The smaller group was referred to the alpha group (A) and the larger group was
referred to as the beta group (B). Individuals were asked in each round to choose X or Y.
For the M treatment, if more members of A(B) chose X than members of B(A) chose X, then
each member of A(B) received 100 and each member of group B(A) received 0. In case of a
tie, each member of each group received the expected value of a fair coin toss, 50. For the
28A sample of the instructions from one of the sessions is in Appendix E.
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P treatment, each voter received a share of 100 proportional to the number of voters in their
party that chose X compared to the number of voters in the other party that chose X. The
voting cost was implemented as an opportunity cost and was referred to as a "Y bonus". It
was added to a players earnings if that player chose Y instead of X. If a player chose X, that
player did not receive their Y bonus in that election. Y-bonuses were randomly redrawn in
every election, independently for each subject, and subjects were only told their own Y bonus.
Bonuses were integer valued and took on values from 0 to 30 in the low cost treatment and 0
to 55 in the high cost treatment. Payo¤s were denominated in points that were converted to
US dollars at a pre-announced rate.29 Each subject earned the sum of their earnings across
all elections. All decisions took place through computers, using the Multistage experimental
software program.30 Subjects were registered students at Caltech.31 Each session lasted about
forty ve minutes and subjects earned between eleven and seventeen dollars, in addition to a
xed payment for showing up on time.
29Each point was equal to $.01.
30http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu
31Data for the high cost M 5-4 and 6-3 elections are from an earlier study with UCLA students as subjects
(Levine and Palfrey 2007), which also used the Multistage software and the same protocol.
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3.2. Experimental Results. Table 2 summarizes the observed turnout rates by treatment.
The table reports turnout by party and also total turnout for each experimental treatment.
The last three columns give the equilibrium turnout levels. The table also reports standard
errors clustered at the individual voter level.
NA NB cmax Rule b b bT   T 
4 5 .3 M 0.622 (.042) 0.636 (.056) 0.630 (.048) .60 .72 .67
3 6 .3 M 0.513 (.050) 0.520 (.073) 0.52 (.063) .51 .52 .52
2 7 .3 M 0.490 (.063) 0.360 (.071) 0.39 (.060) .45 .40 .41
4 5 .55 M 0.479 (.024) 0.451 (.034) 0.464 (.020) .46 .45 .46
3 6 .55 M 0.436 (.021) 0.398 (.031) 0.411 (.019) .41 .37 .39
2 7 .55 M 0.330 (.046) 0.284 (.037) 0.294 (.028) .38 .30 .32
4 5 .3 P 0.547 (.025) 0.486 (.020) 0.51 (.016) .48 .43 .45
3 6 .3 P 0.547 (.054) 0.465 (.061) 0.49 (.042) .55 .39 .45
2 7 .3 P 0.600 (.040) 0.421 (.049) 0.461 (.041) .67 .36 .43
4 5 .55 P 0.362 (.026) 0.370 (.039) 0.367 (.020) .35 .31 .33
3 6 .55 P 0.477 (.037) 0.305 (.033) 0.362 (.027) .40 .29 .32
2 7 .55 P 0.515 (.029) 0.320 (.037) 0.363 (.032) .48 .26 .31
Table 2. Observed turnout rates. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Using these turnout data, we turn to the ve hypotheses generated by the theoretical
equilibrium turnout levels. Recall that there are ve main theoretical predictions from the
pivotal voter model about di¤erences between turnout in the M and P voting systems in the
elections we study. We go through each of these briey below.
H1 For the larger party, turnout is higher in M than P. We nd support for this
hypothesis except for the extreme landslide elections (NA = 2) where turnout rates are
slightly higher in P than M. Thus the theory is supported in four out of six paired
comparisons.
H2 Total turnout is higher under M than under P.We nd support for this hypothesis
except for the extreme landslide elections (NA = 2) where turnout rates are slightly
higher in P than M. However, the low cost elections are the one exception where turnout
is predicted to be higher in P than M. Thus the theory is supported in ve out of six
paired comparisons.
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H3 The competition e¤ect is reversed for the smaller party under P. That is, for
the smaller party, turnout decreases as their share of the electorate increases.
Under P for the majority party, as well as under M, the usual competition
e¤ect applies to both parties: elections that are expected to be closer lead
to higher turnout. We measure the competition e¤ect as the di¤erence in turnout
between the 5-4 and 6-3 elections and the di¤erence in turnout between the 6-3 and 7-2
elections. The sign is correctly predicted in all cases (sixteen out of sixteen comparisons).
H4 The competition e¤ect on total expected turnout is larger in the M elections
than the P elections. This is exactly what we nd in the data. The sign is correctly
predicted in all four cases (four out of four comparisons). The competition e¤ect dif-
ferences are reported in Table 3. For example, for the low cost elections (cmax = :33)
turnout declines by 38% under the M rule, (from 0.63 to 0.39) and only 10% under the
P rule (0.51 to 0.46) in toss-up elections (5-4) compared to the landslide elections (7-2).
In the high cost elections (cmax = :33) the contrast is even sharper: 37% decline under
the M rule, (from 0.46 to 0.29) and less than 3% decline under the P rule (0.37 to 0.36).
Comparison cmax M PbT5=4   bT6=3 0:30 0:11 0:02bT6=3   bT7=2 0:30 0:13 0:03bT5=4   bT7=2 0:30 0:24 0:05bT5=4   bT6=3 0:55 0:04 0:01bT6=3   bT7=2 0:55 0:13 0:00bT5=4   bT7=2 0:55 0:17 0:01
Table 3. Competition E¤ect M vs. P
H5 In all P elections we study, there is an underdog e¤ect. There is an underdog
e¤ect in all M elections, except for the predicted reverse underdog e¤ects in
the low cost 5-4 and 6-3 M elections. Thus, all of our underdog hypotheses have
support in the data. We nd that in all P elections there is an underdog e¤ect, with one
exception where the di¤erence is less than one percentage point (b = :362, b = :370).
That one exception is the 5-4 high cost treatment, where theory predicts the smallest
e¤ect (less than four percentage points). In the M elections, all predicted underdog and
reverse underdog e¤ects are observed in the data. (eleven of twelve comparisons)
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Thus, the comparative statics are correctly predicted in 40 out of 44 paired compar-
isons, with many of these di¤erences signicant at the 5% or 10% level using individual-level
clustered standard errors. To illustrate how close the equilibrium turnout rates are to the equi-
librium turnout rates, Figure 1 presents a scatter plot of the observed vs. equilibrium turnout
rates. A perfect t of the data to the theory would have all the points lined up along the 45%
degree line. A simple OLS regression of the observed turnout on equilibrium turnout, using
the 36 points in the graph gives a slope of .815, an intercept of .097 and an R-squared equal
to .871. The theoretical model slightly underestimates turnout when the model prediction is
below 50% and over-estimates turnout when the model prediction is over 50%, consistent with
the ndings of Levine and Palfrey (2007) on their much larger data set for plurality elections.
Figure 3: Scatter plot of observed vs. equilibrium turnout rates.
4. Robustness and Extensions
The pivotal voter model analyzed above assumes a high degree of rationality on the part
of voters, and the equilibrium nature of the model also assumes that voters have rational
expectations about the turnout decisions of other voters and the probability of being pivotal.
While the experimental ndings are largely supportive of the model, we believe it is important
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to dig deeper into the question of whether the main theoretical results in the paper are robust
to changes in the basic assumptions of the model. In this section, we consider two directions
of robustness: relaxing the full rationality assumption; relaxing the assumption that voters are
selsh and make their voting decisions independently.
4.1. Relaxing the rationality assumption.
4.1.1. Quantal Response Equilibrium. The rst assumption we relax is that voters exactly best
respond in equilibrium. The leading model of "soft" optimization in game theory (i.e., players
do not always choose exact best responses) is quantal response equilibrium (QRE). The standard
QRE model32 posits that voters choose probabilitistically, with choice probabilities increasing
continuously in expected payo¤s, as, for example in probabilistic voting models. That is,
actions with higher expected payo¤s are more likely to be chosen than actions with lower
expected utility, the "best" action is not necessarily chosen with probability one, as it would
be in a Nash equilibrium. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) show that QRE can be represented as
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where players receive privately observed i.i.d. full-support payo¤
disturbances, in addition to the payo¤s of the game itself. The model has been widely used to
analyze experimental game data and explains a wide range of systematic deviations from Nash
equilibrium.
In the voting game, adding these independent disturbances turns out to be equivalent to
changing the cost distribution to have full support on the real line. As explained earlier, this
leads to a zero underdog compensation e¤ect if there are an innite number of voters, since only
voters with non-positive voting costs will turnout in the limit; with full support this implies the
same positive fraction of voters will turn out from both parties. In a nite electorate, underdog
compensation e¤ect can be solved computationally. The main theoretical e¤ects of the Nash
equilibrium model for large electorates therefore apply to the QRE model.
As in Levine and Palfrey (2007), it is a straightforward exercise to t our data to the logit
QRE model. We have done so and this tightens up the correlation between predicted and actual
turnout values. To a rst approximation, the e¤ect of QRE on predicted turnout levels is to
bring them all closer to .5 (See Goeree and Holt 2005). The improvement however is modest.
Appendix 2 gives the tted turnout rates and graphs them against the data, analogously to
Figure 2 above.
32See Goeree et al. (2005)
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4.1.2. Irrational expectations. Past experimental work on turnout (Du¤y and Tavits 2010) and
related participation games (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1991) suggest that voters misperceive the
probability of being pivotal. Thus, rather than having rational expectations about the behavior
of other voters, they have irrational expectations.33 This can easily be adapted to the model in
many ways. For example, we may posit that voters overestimate their pivot probabilities, which
is equivalent to overestimating the benets from voting. This will simply change the equilibrium
cutpoints, but will lead to more rather than less voting compared with the Nash equilibrium
(or less if they underestimate pivot probabilities). However, as long as these perceived pivot
probabilities are exactly zero and have a similar e¤ect on voters from both parties, all the main
results will continue to go through. In particular, there would still be a partial compensation
e¤ect and the it would be di¤erent in M systems than P systems.
4.1.3. Lack of Strategic Sophistication. Recent theoretical models have been developed to ana-
lyze strategic situations where the players of the game are "unsophisticated" in a strategic
sense. The leading models are based on "levels of strategic thinking". Level 0 players are
usually modeled as being completely random. Thus, in the context of the turnout model, any
level-0 voter would turn out with probability 1/2 independently of her voting cost. Level 1
players make optimal voting decisions as a function of their voting cost, assuming all other
voters are level 0. Level k voters make optimal voting decisions as a function of their voting
cost, assuming all other voters are level k-1 or possibly a mixture of lower levels. Thus, these
are models of heterogeneous irrational expectations that take a highly structured form. While
it is beyond the scope of this paper to work out the ne details of a specic level k model for
the turnout game, it is easy to see that there will never be a full underdog compensation e¤ect
if there are any level 0 players34, or if the model is combined with quantal response behavior.
4.2. Non-selsh voting models.
4.2.1. Citizen Duty Models. The rst and simplest model of non-selsh considerations in the
turnout decision is the citizen duty model proposed by Riker and Ordeshook (). According
to this model, failing to vote produces a utility loss due to a guilty conscience for being a
poor citizen. It is trivial to see that adding this term (with or without private information
and heterogeneity) simply changes the distribution of voting costs, as in the QRE model. For
33Alternatively, they have rational expectations about the other voterss behavior, but have beliefs about the
probability of being pivotal that are di¤erent from the equilibrium pivot probability.
34This is true for other specications of level 0 players as well.
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example in its simplest form, it would just shift voting costs down by the citizen duty term,
D.
4.2.2. Group Mobilization Models. Even though we believe that the analysis conducted so far
provides per se many new insights, we want to extend the analysis to other turnout models.
We want to show that our main comparative results are robust, they hold in any model of
turnout. The rational voter model features the well known free riding problem among voters,
which makes turnout in a large election be typically small. Since in large elections the turnout
is not always small, the free riding problem seems to be overcome in some way. Social scientists
di¤er on how to interpret the fact that this collective action problem is by-passed in an election.
Regardless of how this might happen, it is important to know whether the turnout comparisons
across electoral systems depend on the presence of this free riding problem. We want to know
if our results hold also when the positive externality of voting among supporters of the same
party is somehow internalized, and so regardless of the size of the population turnout is high.
Moreover, we can study the mapping from vote shares to power shares not only when it is
at the two extremes of proportional power sharing and winner take all, but also when it is
intermediate, while only the comparison of the two extremes was feasible for us to do in the
rational voter model analyzed so far.
We rst turn to a group mobilization model a la Shachar and Nalebu¤(1999) where parties
campaign e¤orts and spending are able to mobilize and coordinate citizens to go vote. In that
model, each group can "purchase" turnout of its party members by engaging in costly get-
out-the-vote e¤orts. Thus, parties trade o¤ mobilization costs for higher expected vote shares,
taking as given the mobilization choice of the other party. In this, there is zero underdog
compensation in large electorates, as in the pivotal voter model with negative costs, the QRE
model, and the citizen duty models.
4.2.3. Ethical Voter Models. The ethical voter model of Feddersen and Sandroni (2006)) as-
sumes that citizens are rule utilitarian so they act as one. This involves an equilibrium
between two party-planners on each side A and B. In this solution each planner looks at the
total benet from the outcome of the election considering the total cost of voting incurred by
the supporters of his side, taking the other planners turnout strategy as given.. The logic of
the ethical voter models is similar to the group mobilization models. They are almost identical
on the benet side but di¤er slightly on the cost side. In the case of the ethical voter model,
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one gets almost exactly the same kind of partial compensation as in the pivotal voter model
with non-negative costs. Details are given in Appendix C.
5. Concluding Remarks
For any distributions of partisan preferences and voting costs, we have shown that turnout
(of rational voters as well as of ethical voters and of mobilized voters) depends on the degree
of proportionality of inuence in the institutional system in a clear way: higher turnout in a
winner-take-all system than in a proportional power sharing system when the population is
evenly split in terms of partisan preferences, and vice versa when one partys position has a
clear majority of support.
In any considered model and in any considered power sharing system, partial (or zero)
underdog compensation occurs, which guarantees that the ex-ante favorite party obtains in
expectation the higher vote share in the election. Hence, in a winner-take-all system it is quite
clear that underdog cannot win, which greatly discourages the contest, but with power sharing
there is no absolute winner and some competition remains.
The theoretical results are robust to wide range of alternative assumptions about the voting
game and about the rationality of the voters. The common feature of all the various models
considered in this paper is that with heterogeneity of voting costs full underdog compensation
is not possible, and hence the majority party is expected to maintain a considerable advantage
and winning margin in the election. The small probability of victory for the minority, i.e. the
low competitiveness of the electoral race, depresses signicantly the incentives to turn out in
the winner take all system. Whereas in a power sharing system the incentives to vote or to
mobilize voters are a¤ected to a much lesser extent by the competitiveness or the expected
closeness of the electoral race.
Our prediction that for the larger party, turnout is higher in a winner-take-all system than
in a proportional power sharing system was conrmed by the experimental analysis, as well
as most of the other predictions concerning di¤erences in competition and underdog e¤ects:
in particular, it is interesting that the competition e¤ect is reversed for the smaller party in
the proportional system. That is, for the smaller party, turnout decreases as their share of
the electorate increases. With a winner-take-all system, the usual competition e¤ect applies to
both parties: elections that are expected to be closer lead to higher turnout. The prediction
that competition e¤ect on total expected turnout is negligible in a proportional system also
found strong support.
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Appendix A
Welfare corollary. Even though we are primarily interested in the comparative positive ana-
lysis of turnout across institutional systems, the results obtained using the Poisson game ap-
proach allow us to establish a welfare comparison between a winner-take-all system and a
proportional power sharing system.35
>From a welfare perspective, in a world of heterogeneous costs where full compensation
e¤ects cannot hold, the winner-take-all system should intuitively dominate.36
Using total utility as reasonable welfare criterion, it is in line with standard practice to
assess one system to be better than another if for every realization of the parameter q the total
35For a broader discussion of welfare across electoral systems with di¤erent costly voting models see also
Kartal (2010).
36Of course this intuition is model-specic, and as soon as one either changes the model or adds considerations
like fairness, representation, and so forth, the comparison is not robust. That is why we focused primarily on
positive analysis of turnout, where robustness has been possible to achieve.
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sum of expected benets minus total voting costs is higher in such a system. The following
corollary establishes the welfare comparison between systems for N large.
Corollary 8. For q 6= 1=2, the winner-take-all system (M) yields higher welfare than a propor-
tional power sharing system (P).
To see how this follows from our results, consider rst the gross benet side. For any
q 6= 1=2 partial underdog compensation in the M system ensures that the side with the ex-ante
majority support always wins the election. Hence, for q < 1=2 (wlog) the total expected benet
is (1  q) as with N large that fraction of citizens obtains the normalized benet of 1 and the
remaining people get zero. In the P system the power is shared between the two sides, so the
gross benet is
q
q
T

+ (1  q)

(1  q) 
T

which for q < 1=2 is strictly less than (1  q).
Having established the comparison in terms of benets, we just need to add that for any
q 6= 1=2 the total cost due to voter participation in the M system is lower than in the P system
by proposition 7.
For q = 1=2 the voting costs are higher in the M system due to higher participation, but
the benets are also marginally higher in the M system for any given realization of preferences
in which one party has the majority, so welfare is ambiguous.
Extension to many parties. All the analysis in the paper is conducted by altering the
mapping from vote shares to power shares but keeping, for simplicity, the two-party assumption.
However, the comparative results in terms of turnout do not seem to depend on the number
of parties under the P system. We can explicitly compute the equilibrium for any number of
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parties in the P system.37 This allows us to obtain a simple comparative statics result within
the proportional power sharing system: turnout increases in the number of parties.38
To keep notation simple, we illustrate the three party case. Dene
A := qAN; B := qBN; C := qCN; with: qA + qB + qC = 1
The marginal benet39 for party A is
BAP =
1X
a=0
1X
b=0
1X
c=0

e AAa
a!

e BBb
b!

e CCc
c!

a+ 1
a+ b+ c+ 1
  a
a+ b+ c

Lemma 9. The marginal benet has the closed form
BAP =

1  A
A+B + C

1  e (A+B+C)
A+B + C
+

A
A+B+C
  1
3

e (A+B+C)
By symmetry the expressions BBP and B
C
P for parties B or C are straightforward.
For any number of parties the following comparative statics result holds.
Proposition 10. .
 The comparison between turnout in the P system and the M system continues to hold
even when there are multiple parties in the P system.
37This is certainly true under sincere voting. However, we do not think strategic voting in proportional power
sharing systems would change things: a single vote for the preferred party always increases marginally the vote
share for that party even if that party has low support. In general, this would also depend on the distribution
of the intensity of preferences for the parties. In any case, the comparison of turnout incentives across systems
in large elections depends exclusively on the relative speed of convergence across systems. As we show, the
(intermediate) N 1 speed of convergence with power sharing does not depend on the number of parties present
nor, by the same argument, on the (possibly fewer) number of parties voters decide to concentrate their vote
on if they were voting strategically, regardless of intensity of preferences or other cardinality considerations.
38The extension to multiple parties presented here could be useful especially for future research, because
it could help to open a bit the reduced form proportionality of inuence parameter. With many parties the
reduced form linear mapping from vote shares to power shares a la Lizzeri and Persico (2001) can be explicitly
obtained from a standard post election legislative bargaining model of alternating o¤ers a la Baron and Ferejohn
(1989): Snyder, Ting and Ansolabehere (2005) analyze the conditions under which the expected power shares
are proportional to the vote shares.
39Assume again that if nobody votes, power is shared equally, namely
a
a+ b+ c
= 1=3 for a = b = c = 0
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 If parties are symmetric, turnout in the P system increases as the number of parties
increases.
The fact that the turnout comparison result remains unchanged is due to the quantitative
fact that, regardless of the number of parties involved in the election, the marginal benet of
voting in the P system still declines asymptotically at the intermediate rate 1=N , as it was the
case for the P system with two parties.
Within the 1=N order of magnitude of the size e¤ect, turnout increases when there are more
symmetric parties. This is consistent with the fact that smaller parties obtain a higher turnout
in the P system. The intuition for the latter follows from the following two observations. First,
xing the number of votes z for all other parties, the vote share increase for party A is
a+ 1
a+ z + 1
  a
a+ z

=

a2 + a
z
+ 2a+ 1 + z
 1
which is larger for smaller values of the random variable a; i.e. the number of votes for party
A. Second, for a given a; in the marginal benet BAP (see (2) and expressions above) a smaller
party (i.e. a party with a smaller qA) assigns larger probability weight

e AAa
a!

to small values
of a:
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma. 1 We rst show that
lim
N!1
N = lim
N!1
N = 0
Dene the modied Bessel functions of the rst kind, see Abramowitz and Stegun (1965), as
I0 (z) :=
1X
k=0
 
z
2
k
k!
 
z
2
k
k!
; I1 (z) :=
1X
k=0
 
z
2
k
k!
 
z
2
k+1
(k + 1)!
Dening
x := qN; y := (1  q)N; z := 2pxy
then the benets of voting
 
BAM ; B
B
M

can be written as
BAM =
1
2
1X
k=0

e xxk
k!

e yyk
k!

1 +
y
k + 1

=
e xe y
2

I0 (2
p
xy) +
r
y
x
I1 (2
p
xy)

BBM =
1
2
1X
k=0

e xxk
k!

e yyk
k!

1 +
x
k + 1

=
e xe y
2

I0 (2
p
xy) +
r
x
y
I1 (2
p
xy)

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For large z the modied Bessel functions are asymptotically equivalent and approximate
to, see Abramowitz and Stegun (1965)40
I0 (z) ' I1 (z) ' e
z
2z
For any exogenously xed (; ) 2 (0; 1]2 x and y go to innity as N goes to innity, so we can
approximate the benets of voting for large N as
BAM ' e x y+2
p
xy
p
x+
p
y
4
p

pp
xy
1p
x
; BAM ' e x y+2
p
xy
p
x+
p
y
4
p

pp
xy
1p
y
As a consequence for any given (; ) 2 (0; 1]2 the benets of voting vanish as N grows,
namely
lim
N!1
BAM(; ) = 0; lim
N!1
BBM(; ) = 0
Now consider (; ) as endogenous, i.e. solutions to the system
BAM(; ) = F
 1(); BBM(; ) = F
 1()
Since F and F 1 are increasing and continuous with F (0) = 0; then BAM(; ) = F
 1()
implies limN!1 N = 0: Likewise, we have limN!1 N = 0.
Next, we show that
lim
N!1
NN = lim
N!1
NN =1; lim
N!1
N
N
2 (0;1)
Suppose limN!1NN <1 and limN!1NN <1, then
lim
N!1
BAM(N ; N) > 0
and any solution to BAM(; ) = F
 1() would imply limN!1 N > 0, which contradicts
limN!1 N = 0:
Suppose limN!1NN =1 and limN!1NN <1, then limN!1 NN =1 which implies
(using a Taylor expansion of F 1 on the numerator and the denominator around zero) that
limN!1
F 1(N )
F 1(N )
=1:
For all N we have
BAM(N ; N)
BBM(N ; N)
=
F 1(N)
F 1(N)
Taking the limit on one side we have
L := lim
N!1
BAM(N ; N)
BBM(N ; N)
= lim
x
y
!1
I0
 
2
p
xy

+ I1
 
2
p
xy
p
y
x
I0
 
2
p
xy

+ I1
 
2
p
xy
q
x
y
 1
40X (z) ' Y (z) means that limz!1 X(z)Y (z) = 1:
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In fact, L  1 if limx
y
!1
I1(2
p
xy)
I0(2
p
xy)
= 0 and L = 0 if limx
y
!1
I1(2
p
xy)
I0(2
p
xy)
2 (0;+1]: So we have a
contradiction as L  1 cannot be equal to limN!1 F 1(N )F 1(N ) = 1. The same argument shows
that it cannot be the case that limN!1NN <1 and limN!1NN =1:
The above arguments also imply that we cannot have either
lim
N!1
N
N
= 0; lim
N!1
N
N
=1

Proof of Proposition 2. For N large, since limN!1NN = limN!1NN =1 we can use the
asymptotic expression for the modied Bessel functions, so the system becomes
BAM '
e N(h g)
2
p
N
g + h
4
p

p
hg
1
g
= F 1 ()
BBM '
e N(h g)
2
p
N
g + h
4
p

p
hg
1
h
= F 1 ()
where we dened
g :=
p
q; h :=
p
(1  q) M ()
The above system yields
p
qF 1 () =
p
(1  q) F 1 ()
Since the function
p
F 1 () is increasing we can dene the function
 := M ()
where M : [0; 1]  ! [0; 1] is an increasing and di¤erentiable function with M (0) = 0. The
system is reduced to a single equation
BAM (; M ()) = F
 1 () ;
We now show existence of a solution to the above equation by showing that the two con-
tinuous functions on either side must cross at least once.
Assume wlog q < 1=2: We have
 2 (0; 1] =) g < h
and for any xed N; we have
lim
!0
e N(h g)
2
p
N
g + h
4
p

p
hg
1
g
> lim
!0
e N(h g)
2
p
N
2
4
p

p
hg
=1
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For  = 1 we have h > g =
p
q, so for all N above a certain value we have
e N(h g)
2
p
N

g + h
4
p

p
gh
1
g

< 1
which proves existence of a solution, because F 1 () is increasing and F 1 (1) = 1:
For uniqueness we need to show that the BAM is decreasing in , namely that the following
quantity is negative
d
dg
 
e N(h g)
2
p
N
g + h
4
p
g
p
hb
!
=
e N(h g)
2
p
N

 2N (h  g) d (h  g)
dh
g + h
4
p
g
p
gh
+
d
dh

g + h
4
p
g
p
gh

For large N this derivative will be negative if and only if
d (h  g)
da
=
p
1  qp
q
d0
d0
  1 > 0
where we dened
0 : =
p
; 0 :=
p

G (0) : = 0F 1

(0)2

=
p
F 1 ()
we have p
1  q

G (0) = (
p
q)G (0) =)
p
1  qp
q
d0
d0
=
G0 (0)
G0 (0)
So we need G0 to be increasing
G0 (0) =
d
d
 p
F 1 ()
 d
d0
= 2
d
d
 
F 1 ()

so it su¢ ces for F 1 () to be weakly convex, so it su¢ ces to have F () weakly concave.
As for the size e¤ect, note that the marginal benet side BAP decreases with N for all 
while the cost side remains unchanged. Hence by the implicit function theorem as we increase
N we have lower  which implies lower  and in turn lower turnout, formally
0 =
d
 
BAM   F 1

d
d
dN
+
d
 
BAM   F 1

dN
d
dN
=  
dBAM
dN
d(BAM F 1)
d
< 0 =) d
dN
< 0 =) dTM
dN
< 0
The underdog compensation is a consequence of F 1 being increasing, namely
q
 
F 1 ()
2
= (1  q)   F 1 ()2
q < 1=2 ()  > ; q < (1  q) 

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Proof of Lemma 4. For given (; ) call the expected number of voters for each partyR := qN,
S := (1  q)N; we have
BAP = e
 R S
1X
a=0
1X
b=0

Ra
a!

Sb
b!

a+ 1
a+ b+ 1
  a
a+ b

By di¤erentiating and integrating the summands and inverting the series and integral operators
we have
1X
b=0
Sb
b!
a
a+ b
=
a
Sa
1X
b=0
Z S
0
d
dr

1
b!
ra+b
a+ b

dr =
=
a
Sa
Z S
0
1X
b=0

1
b!
ra+b 1

dr =
8>>><>>>:
a
Sa
R S
0
ra 1erdr for a  1
1=2 for a = 0
and
1X
b=0
Sb
b!
a+ 1
a+ b+ 1
=
a+ 1
Sa+1
Z S
0
raerdr
By inverting the series and integral operators again in the series over a, we have
BAP = e
 R S
 1X
a=0
Ra
a!

a+ 1
Sa+1
Z S
0
raerdr

 
1X
a=1
Ra
a!

a
Sa
Z S
0
ra 1erdr

  1
2
!
= e R S
0B@Z S
0
0B@ 1S
P1
a=0
(RS r)
a
a!
+
P1
a=1
(RS r)
a
(a 1)!

 R
S
P1
a=1
(RS r)
a 1
(a 1)!
1CA erdr   1
2
1CA
= e R S

1
S2
Z S
0
e(1+
R
S )r (S  RS +Rr) dr   1
2

=
S
(R + S)2
  e
 (R+S)
(R + S)2
S2  R2 + S
2
and by symmetry
BBP (R;S) = B
A
P (S;R)

Proof of Lemma 5. We rst show that
lim
N!1
N = lim
N!1
N = 0
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For any xed  > 0 and  > 0, by inspection of the closed form expression (2) we see that
limN!1BAP (; ) = limN!1B
B
P (; ) = 0, so the same argument obtained in Lemma (1) for
the M system applies.
Next, we show that
lim
N!1
NN = lim
N!1
NN =1; lim
N!1
N
N
2 (0;1)
Summing the two P system equations we have
1
NT

1  e
 NT
2

= F 1 () + F 1 ()
Since the RHS goes to zero the LHS will too, which means that NT must go to innity
so we cannot have both limN!1NN < 1 and limN!1NN < 1. For N large, since the
exponential terms e NT in (2) vanish faster than the hyperbolic terms, the system approximates
to
(5)
(1  q) 
NT 2
= F 1 () ;
q
NT 2
= F 1 ()
Suppose limN!1NN =1 and limN!1NN <1, then limN!1 NN =1 which implies
(using a Taylor expansion of F 1 on the numerator and the denominator around zero) that
limN!1
F 1(N )
F 1(N )
=1: From (5) we have
1  q
q
N
N
=
F 1(N)
F 1(N)
so we reach a contradiction as the above equality cannot hold as N !1: The same argument
shows that it cannot be the case that limN!1NN <1 and limN!1NN =1:
The above arguments also imply that we cannot have either
lim
N!1
N
N
= 0; lim
N!1
N
N
=1

Proof of Proposition 6. The approximated system (5) yields
qF 1 () = (1  q) F 1 ()
q < 1=2 ()  > 
Since the function F 1 () is increasing we can dene
 := P ()
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where P () : [0; 1]  ! [0; 1] is an increasing di¤erentiable function with P (0) = 0. We now
reduced the P system to one equation
BAP :=
(1  q) P ()
NT 2
= F 1 ()
which we now show has one and only one solution.
The cost side F 1 () is increasing from 0 to 1. Uniqueness comes from the fact that the
benet side decreases in  as its derivative is proportional to
@BAP
@
/ [0P () (q+ (1  q) P ())  2P () (q + (1  q) 0P ())]
=   [((1  q)    q) 0P () + 2qP ()] < 0
as
 >  =) q < qF
 1 ()
F 1 ()
= (1  q) 
Existence comes form the fact that for  approaching zero the benet diverges as for any xed
N we have
lim
!0
1
N
(1  q) P ()
(q+ (1  q) P ())2
> lim
!0
1
N
(1  q)

P

=1
because
lim
!0
P

= lim
!0
q
1  q
F 1 ()
F 1 (P )
>
q
1  q > 0
and for  = 1 we have eventually (i.e. for all N above a certain value),
1
N

(1  q) P (1)
(q + (1  q) P (1))2

< F 1 (1) = 1
Hence a unique solution (P ; P (P )) exists for the equilibrium problem.
The proofs for the size e¤ect and the underdog compensation e¤ect are analogous to the
ones obtained in the M system. 
Proof of Proposition 7. First, we compare turnouts. Assuming the cost side F 1 () is the same
in the two systems, it su¢ ces to show that the benet sides of the equations determining the
equilibrium  are ranked.
For any q 6= 1=2 we need to show that eventually (i.e. for any N above a given N) we have
BAM (; M ()) < B
A
P (; P ()) ; for all  2 (0; 1]
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namely
e
 N
p
q 
p
(1 q)M
2p
N <
(1  q) P
(q+ (1  q) P )2
 p
q+
p
(1  q) M
4
p
 (q (1  q)M)1=4
1p
q
! 1
which is satised as LHS above converges to zero, whereas the RHS is a positive constant for
all  2 (0; 1] because
 2 (0; 1] =) P 2 (0; 1]; M 2 (0; 1]
q 6= 1=2 =) pq 6=
p
(1  q) M ()
Hence, for any eventually we have
q 6= 1=2 =) M < P
The symmetry property  (q) =  (1  q) (which holds in both the M and P systems) implies
q 6= 1=2 =) M < P
hence
q 6= 1=2 =) TM < TP
For q = 1=2 we have  =  in both P and M systems. We need to show that eventually
BAM > B
A
P ;  2 (0; 1]
namely
1p
N

2
p
q
4
p


1
q
>
1
N

q
2 (2q)2

Rearranging we have
p
N

1
2
p

p
q

>

1
8q

which is satised as the RHS is a positive constant and the LHS increases to innity. Hence
q = 1=2 =) M > P =) TM > TP
Next, we compare underdog compensation e¤ects. Given that for the M system we have
qM
 
F 1 (M)
2
= (1  q) M
 
F 1 (M)
2
and for the P system we have
qP
 
F 1 (P )

= (1  q) P
 
F 1 (P )

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then
1  q
q
=

P
P
2 F 1(P )
P
F 1(P )
P
!
=

M
M
3 F 1(M )
M
F 1(M )
M
!2
By denition of derivative at zero we have
dF 1
dx
jx=0 = lim
x!0
F 1 (x)
x
2 (0;1)
For N large,  and  converge to zero both in the M and in the P system so
lim
N!1
 
F 1()

F 1()

!
= 1
and the result follows. If dF
 1
dx
jx=0 2 f0;1g then the above limit is indeterminate and the result
need not be true. If the function F 1 is innitely di¤erentiable and n is the lowest integer for
which
dnF 1
dxn
jx=0 2 (0;1)
then by iterating the procedure we have
lim
N!1
 
dn 1F 1()
dn 1
dn 1F 1()
dn 1
!
= 1
so the underdog compensation comparison generalizes to
1  q
q
=

P
P
n+1
=

M
M
2n+1

Proof of Lemma 9. Express the following series by di¤erentiating and integrating the sum-
mands and inverting the series and integral operators
1X
b=0
Bb
b!
a
a+ b+ c
=
a
Ba+c
1X
b=0
Z B
0
d
dr

1
b!
ra+b+c
a+ b+ c

dr
=
a
Ba+c
Z B
0
1X
b=0

1
b!
ra+b+c 1

dr =
8>>><>>>:
a
Ba+c
R B
0
ra+c 1erdr for a  1
1=3 for a = c = 0
and likewise
1X
b=0
Bb
b!
a+ 1
a+ b+ 1
=
a+ 1
Ba+c+1
Z B
0
ra+cerdr
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We compute the marginal benet for party A by inverting the series and integral operators
again over the series over a.
BAP = e
 (A+B+C)
0@ 1X
c=0
Cc
c!
0@ P1a=0 Aaa!  a+1Ba+c+1 R B0 ra+cerdr
 P1a=1 Aaa!  aBa+c R B0 ra+c 1erdr
1A  1
3
1A
= e (A+B+C)
0@ 1X
c=0
Cc
c!
0@ R B0 rcBc+1  (Ar=B) e(Ar=B) + e(Ar=B) erdr
  R B
0
rc 1
Bc
 
(Ar=B) e(Ar=B)

erdr
1A  1
3
1A
Inverting the series and integral operators again over the series over c.
BAP = e
 (A+B+C)
0@ R B0  (Ar=B) e(Ar=B) + e(Ar=B)  P1c=0 Ccc! rcBc+1  erdr
  R B
0
 
(Ar=B) e(Ar=B)
 P1
c=0
Cc
c!
rc 1
Bc

erdr   1
3
1A
= e (A+B+C)
Z B
0

A
B
re
A+B+C
B
r + e
A+B+C
B
r

1
B
  A
B
e
A+B+C
B
r

dr   1
3

Computing the integral and simplifying, we have
BAP = e
 (A+B+C)
0@0@ AB  1 eA+B+C(A+B+C)2 + eA+B+CA+B+C + B eA+B+C 1A+B+C  1B
 A
B

B e
A+B+C 1
A+B+C

1A  1
3
1A
=

1  A
A+B + C

1  e (A+B+C)
A+B + C
+

A
A+B+C
  1
3

e (A+B+C)

Proof of Proposition 10. A similar calculation gives the analogous result for r parties:
BAP (r) =
0@  1  AA+B+C+:::+r 1 e (A+B+C+:::+r)A+B+C+:::+r
+
 
A
A+B+C+:::+r   1r

e (A+B+C+:::+r)
1A
For large enough N; BAP approximates to
BAP '

1  A
A+B + C + :::+ r

1
A+B + C + :::+ r
=

qB + qC + ::
(qA + qB + qC + ::)
2

1
N
so the benet still decreases as N 1, which implies a higher turnout than in M except in the
case when the two parties in M have the same ex-ante support: q = 1=2.
For r parties with equal ex-ante support we have
qA = qB = qC = ::: = qr = 1=r =)  =  =  = :::
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the rst order condition for a party becomes
1  1
r

1  e rN
rN


1  1
r

1
rN
= F 1 (r)
so the turnout for that party r increases in r: Overall turnout increases too as in this symmetric
case we have.
Tr = r

Appendix C: Group Mobilization and Ethical Voting
As before, the population is a continuum of measure one, divided into q A supporters
and (1  q) B supporters. For any voting cost thresholds (c; c) ; i.e., given that the voter
participation for each side is ( = F (c) ;  = F (c)), turnout is again T = q+ (1  q): We
assume F is weakly concave.41
5.1. Cost Side for Mobilization Model. Amobilization model assumes that more campaign
spending by a party brings more votes for the party according to an exogenous technology. In
major elections, candidates and parties engage in hugely expensive get-out-the-vote drives.
Empirical evidence suggests that these drives are e¤ective. We consider a very simple version
of group mobilization. We assume the cost for a party of mobilizing to the polls all his sup-
porters with voting cost below c is l (c), where c 2 [0; c] and l is increasing, convex and twice
di¤erentiable. We also assume it is innitely costly for a party to turn out all its supporters:
l (c) =1.
5.2. Benet Side under any Power Sharing Rule. The expected vote shares for party A
and B are
V =
q
T
; 1  V = (1  q) 
T
The expected power share as a function of the vote share is the standard contest success
function42
PA (V ) =
V 
V  + (1  V ) ; P
B
 (V ) =
(1  V )
V  + (1  V )
41The same condition was needed to have uniqueness of a solution in the rational voter M-model.
42See for instance Hirshleifer (1989), among others. When nobody votes ( =  = 0) assume equal shares
(V = 1=2):
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Below we illustrate the power share PA as a function of the vote share V for various power
sharing parameters , namely:  = 1 (i.e. the P system, dashed line),  = 5 (i.e. approaching
the M system, continuous line), and  !1 (i.e. a pure M system, dotted line).
Figure 4: Power Sharing Functions in the P (dashed), approaching the M system (continuous)
and pure M system (dotted).
The marginal benets with respect to (c; c) are respectively

V (1  V )
 
V
1 V

1 +
 
V
1 V
2 (1  q) T 2

qf (c) ;

V (1  V )
 
V
1 V

1 +
 
V
1 V
2 qT 2 (1  q) f (c)
5.3. First Order Conditions and Underdog Compensation E¤ects. For the ethical voter
models we have as rst order conditions

V (1  V )
 
V
1 V

1 +
 
V
1 V
2 (1  q) T 2

qf (c) = qcf (c)

V (1  V )
 
V
1 V

1 +
 
V
1 V
2 qT 2 (1  q) f (c) = (1  q) cf (c)
which gives the condition
qF 1 () = (1  q) F 1 ()
The above is a partial underdog compensation condition which happens to be the same as the
partial underdog compensation condition (3) obtained in the P system of the rational voter
model.
For the mobilization model we have
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V (1  V )
 
V
1 V

1 +
 
V
1 V
2 (1  q) T 2

qf (c) = l
0 (c)

V (1  V )
 
V
1 V

1 +
 
V
1 V
2 qT 2 (1  q) f (c) = l0 (c)
which yields the following zero underdog compensation condition
l0 (c)
f (c)
=
l0 (c)
f (c)
=) T =  = ; c = c
that is, both parties turn out the same proportion of their supporters.43
5.4. Solution to the Mobilization Model. The mobilization model is reduced to one equa-
tion in one unknown, equating marginal benet (MB) and marginal cost
(6) MB = 
 
V
1 V

1 +
 
V
1 V
2 = 

q
1 q

h
1 +

q
1 q
i2 = G ()
where
G () := 
l0 (c)
f (c)
is increasing in . The solution is hence unique and it exists because l (c) = 1. The solution
has the following properties:
(1) Turnout T =  increases when the marginal benet (MB) increases;
(2) As  goes to innity (M model) the marginal benet goes to innity when q = 1=2 and
goes to zero otherwise;
(3) When  = 1 (P model) the marginal benet
( q1 q )
[1+( q1 q )]
2 is positive for all q 2 (0; 1) and
peaks but stays nite at q = 1=2:
The picture below shows the marginal benet as a function of the closeness of the election
q for  = 1 (i.e. the P system, dashed line), and for  = 5 (i.e. approximating the M system,
continuous line).
43We need to assume F weakly concave (as in the rational voter M model) to guarantee the LHS expressions
above are increasing in their argument.
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Figure 5: Marginal benet as a function of q in the P system (dashed) and approaching the M
system (continuous).
Turnout T =  can be obtained by a simple rescaling, namely by inverting (6) (i.e.:
T = G 1 (MB)) which preserves the qualitative features of the picture above. Hence, the
turnout comparison across systems is analogous to what we already obtained in the rational
voter model (see Figure 1).
5.5. Cost Side for Ethical Voter Model. The ethical voter model assumes that citizens are
rule utilitarianso they act as one. This means that we have to nd a party-planner solution
on each side A and B. In this solution each planner looks at the total benet from the outcome
of the election considering the total cost of voting incurred by the supporters of his side.44 The
cost of turning out the voters for the social planner on side A is the total cost born by all the
citizens on side A that vote, namely
C (c) := q
Z c
0
cf (c) dc
The citizens with cost below the planner-chosen cost threshold c vote because ethical voter
models assume citizens get an exogenous benetD (larger than their private voting cost c  c)
for doing their partin following the optimal rule established by the planner.
5.6. Solution to the Ethical Voter Model. The solution for the ethical voter model is
more complicated, as the underdog compensation is strictly partial (not zero), so  6=  and
44We assume collectivism, so the planner on each side, A and B, only looks at the total cost of voting of
the voters on his side. The results would not changed if we assumed altruismas in Feddersen and Sandroni
(2006): each planner takes into account the cost of voting of all citizens that vote regardless of their side.
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we maintain the two equations in two unknowns, that is
qF 1 () = (1  q) F 1 () = 

q
(1 q)

h
1 +

q
(1 q)
i2
However, given that the underdog compensation is not full the comparative statics is similar to
the case of zero compensation obtained in the mobilization model. Namely if a solution (; )
exists,45 then  and ; and hence T; increase when the marginal benet increases. Taking limits,
as  goes to innity (M model) the marginal benet on the RHS goes to innity when q = 1=2
and to zero otherwise. When  = 1 (P model) the marginal benet
( q1 q )
[1+( q1 q )]
2 is positive for all
q 2 (0; 1) and peaks but stays nite at q = 1=2:
Note that if the underdog compensation were full (which happens for instance with homo-
geneous costs) the marginal benet becomes
MB = 

q
(1 q)

h
1 +

q
(1 q)
i2 = 4
so the result would be di¤erent: regardless of the initial preference split q; turnout and MB
would increase with the intensity of the contest : As explained, the rational voter model with
homogenous cost gives an equivalent result.
6. Appendix D: Results from QRE estimation
Table E1 displays the estimated logit QRE turnout rates. The estimated value of b is 7
for the the M data and 17 for the P data. There is essentially no change in the estimated QRE
turnout rates if b is constrained to be equal in both treatments.
45Coate and Conlin (2004) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) provide specic conditions on the voting cost
distributions that guarantee existence.
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NA NB cmax Rule b b bT b b T b
4 5 .3 M 0.622 (.042) 0.636 (.056) 0.630 (.048) 0.61 0.65 0.63
3 6 .3 M 0.513 (.050) 0.520 (.073) 0.52 (.063) 0.51 0.52 0.52
2 7 .3 M 0.490 (.063) 0.360 (.071) 0.39 (.060) 0.44 0.42 0.42
4 5 .55 M 0.479 (.024) 0.451 (.034) 0.464 (.020) 0.48 0.45 0.46
3 6 .55 M 0.436 (.021) 0.398 (.031) 0.411 (.019) 0.44 0.40 0.41
2 7 .55 M 0.330 (.046) 0.284 (.037) 0.294 (.028) 0.33 0.28 0.29
4 5 .3 P 0.547 (.025) 0.486 (.020) 0.51 (.016) 0.48 0.44 0.46
3 6 .3 P 0.547 (.054) 0.465 (.061) 0.49 (.042) 0.55 0.40 0.45
2 7 .3 P 0.600 (.040) 0.421 (.049) 0.461 (.041) 0.65 0.37 0.43
4 5 .55 P 0.362 (.026) 0.370 (.039) 0.367 (.020) 0.35 0.32 0.33
3 6 .55 P 0.477 (.037) 0.305 (.033) 0.362 (.027) 0.40 0.29 0.33
2 7 .55 P 0.515 (.029) 0.320 (.037) 0.363 (.032) 0.48 0.27 0.32
Table 4. Observed turnout rates. Clustered standard errors in parenthesis.
The scatter plot of the QRE turnout rates against the observed turnout rates is given below.
Note that the slope has increased from 0.82 to 0.89, the constant term has decreased from 0.10
to 0.07 and the R2 has increased from .87 to .91.
Figure 6: Turnout Rates
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7. Appendix E: Online Supplementary Material
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this decision making experiment. During
the experiment we require your complete, undistracted attention, and ask that you follow
instructions carefully. You may not open other applications on your computer, chat with
other students, or engage in other distracting activities, such as using your phone, reading
books, etc. You will be paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the experiment.
Di¤erent participants may earn di¤erent amounts. What you earn depends partly on your
decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. The entire experiment will
take place through computer terminals, and all interaction between you will take place through
the computers. It is important that you not talk or in any way try to communicate with
other participants during the experiments. During the instruction period, you will be given a
complete description of the experiment and will be shown how to use the computers. If you
have any questions during the instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be
answered out loud so everyone can hear. If you have any questions after the experiment has
begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you.
We will begin with a brief practice session to help familiarize you with the computer
interface. The practice rounds will be followed by 2 di¤erent paid sessions. Each paid session
will consist of 50 rounds. At the end of the last paid session, you will be paid the sum of what
you have earned in all rounds of the two paid sessions, plus the show-up fee of $5.00. Everyone
will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you earned.
Your earnings during the experiment are denominated in POINTS. Your DOLLAR earnings are
determined by multiplying your earnings in POINTS by a conversion rate. In this experiment,
the conversion rate is 0.002, meaning that 100 POINTS is worth 20 cents.
We will now go through two practice rounds to explain the rules for the rst part of the
experiment, and will explain the screen display. During the practice rounds, please do not hit
any keys until I tell you, and when you are prompted by the computer to enter information,
please wait for me to tell you exactly what to enter. You are not paid for these practice rounds.
[AUTHENTICATE CLIENTS]
Please pull out your dividers. Please double click on the icon on your desktop that says
MULTISTAGE CLIENT. When the computer prompts you for your name, type your First and
Last name. Then click SUBMIT and wait for further instructions.
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SCREEN 1 (user interface)
[Point out while reading the following.]
You now see the rst screen of the experiment on your computer. It should look similar
to this screen. Please do not do anything with your mouse yet, until I have nished explaining
the screen. [POINT TO PPT SLIDE DISPLAYED ON SCREEN IN FRONT OF ROOM]
Here are the instructions for the rst part of the experiment. At the top of the screen will
be your id number. Each of you has been assigned to one of two groups, called the ALPHA
GROUP and the BETA GROUP. The ALPHA group always has 2 members and the BETA
group always has 7 members. The screen informs you which group you will be in and reminds
you how many members are in each group.
Each of you will be asked to choose either Xor Yby clicking on a button with the
mouse. Please wait and dont do anything yet.
The sample display in front of the room shows you what the screen looks like for a member
of the Alpha group. The screen also tells you what your Y bonusis. This is an extra bonus
you earn if you choose Y instead of X, independent of what other participants choose.
Your earnings are computed in the following way. It is very important that you understand
this, so please listen carefully.
SCREEN 2
[Point while reading.] First suppose you choose X. To compute your earnings, we compare
the number of members of your group choosing Xto the number of members of the other
group choosing X. Your payo¤ is 105 if the number of members in your group choosing X is
greater than the number of members of the other group who choose X. Your payo¤ is 55 if the
number of members in your group choosing X is equal to the number of members of the other
group who choose X. Your payo¤ is 5 if the number of members in your group choosing X is
fewer than the number of members of the other group who choose X.
Your earnings are computed slightly di¤erently if you choose Y. Specically, in addition to
the above earnings (either 105, 55, or 5) you also earn your Y bonus. This payo¤ information
is displayed in a table on your screen.
The amount of each participants Y-bonus is assigned completely randomly by the computer
at the beginning of each round and is shown in the second line down from the top of the screen.
Y-bonuses are assigned separately for each participant, so di¤erent participants will typically
have di¤erent Y-bonuses. What you see up the front is just an example of one participants
Y-bonus. In any given round you will have an equal chance of being assigned any Y-bonus
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between 0 and 30 points. Your Y-bonus in each round will not depend on your Y-bonus or
decisions in previous rounds, or on the Y-bonuses and decisions of other participants. While
you will be told your own Y-bonus in each round before making a decision, you will never be
told the Y-bonuses of other participants. You will only know that each of the other participants
has a Y-bonus that is some number between 0 and 30.
At this time, if your ID number is even, please click on row label Y; if your ID number is
odd, please click on the row label X. Once everyone has made their selection, the results from
this rst practice round are displayed on your screen. It will look like
SCREEN 3
if your choice was X, and
SCREEN 4
if your choice was Y.
This completes the rst practice round, and you now see a screen like this. The bottom
of the screen contains a history panel. This panel will be updated to reect the history of all
previous rounds. [go over columns of history screen]
At the beginning of every new round you will be randomly re-assigned to new groups,
and will have the opportunity to choose between Xand Y. In other words, you will not
necessarily be in the same group during each round. You will also be randomly reassigned a
new Y-bonus at the beginning of each round.
We will now go to a second practice round. When this practice round is over, an online
quiz will appear on your screen. Everyone must answer all the questions correctly before we
can proceed to the paid rounds. Does anyone have any question?
Please take note of your new group assignment, alpha or beta, since the group assignments
are shu­ ed randomly between each round. Also, please take note of your new Y-bonus, which
has been randomly redrawn between the values of 0 and 30.
[SLIDE 4 ]
GO TO NEXT MATCH
Please make your decision now by clicking on the row label X or Y.
A quiz is now displayed on your screen. Please read each question carefully and select
the correct answer. Once everyone has answered all the questions correctly, you may all go
on to the second page of the quiz. After everyone has correctly answered the second page of
questions, we will begin the rst paid session. If you have any questions as you are completing
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the quiz, please feel free to raise your hand and I will go to your workstation to answer your
question.
The rst paid session will follow the same instructions as the practice session. There will
be a total of 50 rounds in the rst paid session. Let me summarize those instructions before
we start.
[Go over summary slide.] Are there any questions before we begin the rst paid session?
[Answer questions.] Please begin. There will be 50 rounds, and then you will receive new
instructions. (Play rounds 1 50) The rst session is now over.
SESSION 2
We will now begin session 2.
[SLIDE 5]
The second paid session will be slightly di¤erent from the rst session. Let me summarize
those rules before we start. Please listen carefully. The rules are the same as before with only
one exception. In each round of this session, you will have an equal chance of being assigned a
Y-bonus between 0 and 55 points. Again, our Y-bonus in each round will not depend on your Y-
bonus or decisions in previous rounds, or on the Y-bonuses and decisions of other participants.
While you will be told your own Y-bonus in each round before making a decision, you will
never be told the Y-bonuses of the other participants. You will only know that each of the
other participants has a Y-bonus that is some number between 0 and 55. You may choose X
or Y.
There will be 50 rounds in this second session. After each round, group assignments will be
randomly reshu­ ed and everyone will be reassigned a new Y-bonus. Therefore, some rounds
you will be in the Alpha group and other rounds you will be in the Beta group. In either case,
everyone is told which group they are in and what their private Y-bonus is, before making a
choice of X or Y.
Are there any questions before we begin the second paid session? (no quiz) Please Begin.
(Play rounds 1 50)
Session 2 is now over. Please record your total earnings in dollars for the experiment on
your record sheet. After you have recorded your earnings, click the okbutton. We cannot pay
anyone until everyone has recorded their earnings AND clicked the ok button. Please remain
seated and you will be called up one by one according to your ID number to have your recorded
earnings amount checked against our own record. Please wait patiently and do not talk or use
the computers.
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